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13 May 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Haiti - Dominican Republic: Further internal or Dominican-backed action against Haitian dictator Duvalier could come soon, despite the apparent easing of tension in both countries.

Dominican President Bosch told US Ambassador Martin on 10 May that the OAS failure thus far to take strong action in Haiti had humiliated him and had given his political enemies at home additional ammunition to use against him. Bosch's political need for some sort of victory over Duvalier is almost certain to generate additional Dominican overt pressures or clandestine efforts against the Haitian dictator. However, Ambassador Martin now regards a Dominican invasion of Haiti as unlikely, barring any new Haitian provocation.

Aside from the diminishing Dominican military threat, the only real danger to Duvalier's position at present appears to come from the opposition group led by Clement Barbot, who reportedly is gaining new adherents. If earlier reports that the Barbot group would launch its maximum efforts against Duvalier in the 10-15 May period are borne out, US Ambassador Thurston believes that reprisals by Duvalier would be widespread and brutal.

(Venezuela will withdraw its diplomatic mission from Haiti on 15 May, the day Duvalier's legal term of office expires, according to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Falcon Briceno. The move may induce other hemisphere countries to follow suit and may give some encouragement to Duvalier's opposition.

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*Argentina: The stability of the Guido government will remain precarious while the President tries to form a new cabinet.

All of the civilian ministers and the three service secretaries resigned late on 12 May in a successful move to force the resignation of Interior Minister Rauch.

General Rauch's exit was probably a compromise decision worked out by Army Commander in Chief Ongania and other military commanders. Although they support the general line of Rauch's campaign, they would like to reduce the political turmoil and threat to Guido prior to the 7 July elections.

Rauch precipitated the present crisis on 9 May by publishing charges against four cabinet ministers as part of his campaign against the "corrupt" influence of Peron, ex-President Frondizi, and Frondizi's adviser, Rogelio Frigerio.

Many civilian as well as military elements share Rauch's desire to prevent these three from regaining powerful influence and fear their present collaboration on the selection of a presidential candidate for the Peronist-supported front. Rauch's attacks on the ministers and others were apparently too broad in scope, however.

Ra despite	uch, Ongania, and other officers maintain that, the crisis, the elections will be held on sched-
ule.	

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DAILY BRIEF

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Syria-Iraq: The simultaneous reshuffling of the Baathist-dominated Syrian and Iraqi cabinets on 11 May appears designed to lessen pro-Nasir pressure in both countries, but Cairo's propaganda attacks and subversion will continue.

Cairo radio already has charged the Syrian regime with setting up a "fake national pro-unity front." The appointment of Sami al-Jundi as Syria's new prime minister-designate is a gesture toward compromise, but the reported retention of the key Ministry of Interior post by Baathist Brigadier Amin al-Hafiz leaves the Baath in a commanding position. Hafiz carried out the tough crackdown on pro-Nasir rioters last week.

In Iraq, the cabinet had come under increasing criticism for its pro-Baathist policies and failure to solve outstanding problems. Dropping Deputy Prime Minister Ali Salih Sadi, the leader of the Iraqi Baath, from overt participation in the regime may disarm the Baath's critics even though Baathist Prime Minister Ahmad Hasan Bakr will retain his post.

In each of the two countries the dismissal of the cabinet was announced by the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, the actual executive organ of government. These councils are composed of key military men and civilian Baathist leaders who decide policy, while the cabinets are largely facades.

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NOTES

Cuba: Fidel Castro apparently has abandoned his plans to visit Switzerland after leaving the USSR and will return directly to Cuba,

If this re-

port is true, it would rule out for the present the visits to a Scandinavian country and to Pope John which Castro is said to have contemplated. Castro presumably would also defer until later this year his publicly announced visit to Algeria.

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Hungary: Hungarian Premier Kadar has made a new bid for improved relations with the US, declaring that his regime is "ready to answer all questions"— presumably including the extent of the March amnesty. Speaking before a trade union congress on 11 May, he asserted that agreement is possible "on many points." He declared that a major policy aim has been to straighten out the "difficulties" created by the 1956 revolution.

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Sino-Soviet Relations: The running debate between Moscow and Peiping on Yugoslavia indicates that the Chinese agreement to send a delegation to the USSR for bilateral negotiations has not brought the two sides closer to a settlement of their differences. In quick reply to several anti-Yugoslav articles and broadcasts by Peiping on 9 May, Izvestia's evening edition of 10 May carried a laudatory article on Belgrade's new constitution and contradicted Peiping's charge that Yugoslavia was not a socialist country. In a clear bid for North Vietnamese support, the Chinese chief of state told a 12 May rally in Hanoi that Communist foreign policy "must not be reduced to the single aspect of peaceful coexistence."

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